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ABSTRACT
After the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake in 1995, 
the Japanese national disaster medical system (NDMS) 
was developed. It mainly consists of four components, 
namely, a disaster base hospital, an emergency medical 
information system, a disaster medical assistance team 
(DMAT), and national aeromedical evacuation (AE). 
The NDMS was tested for the first time in a real disas-
ter situation during the Great East Japan Earthquake 
in 2011. Two airports and one base were appointed as 
DMAT gathering places, and approximately 393 DMAT 
members divided into 78 teams were transported by 
Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) aircrafts to 
two AE staging bases the following day. Staging care 
units were installed at Hanamaki Airport, Fukushima 
Airport, and the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force 
Camp Kasuminome, and 69, 14 and 24 DMAT teams 
were placed at those locations, respectively. In total, 19 
patients were evacuated using JASDF fixed-wing air-
craft. Important issues requiring attention became clear 
through the experiences of the Great East Japan Earth-
quake and will be discussed in this paper. 
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THE GREAT HANSHIN-AWAJI EARTHQUAKE
A magnitude 7.3 earthquake on the Richter scale hit the 
Kobe and Awaji areas at 05:46 JST on January 17, 1995, 
leaving approximately 6,434 people dead, over 43,000 
people injured, and more than 316,000 people homeless. 
It is reported that many lives that could have been saved 
were lost in the earthquake, mainly due to a lack of a 
national disaster medical system.1 
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 Many hospitals were unable to sufficiently func-
tion for the following three reasons: the poor structural 
integrity of buildings, lost hospital infrastructure (i.e., 
utilities), and the fragility of equipment. Nishi-shimin 
Hospital, one of two municipal hospitals in Kobe, was 
composed of seven stories, five of which had been con-
structed 25 years before the earthquake, while the two 
stories at the top had been added seven years later. The 
fifth floor had partially collapsed, trapping 44 patients 
and three nurses inside. Many hospitals lost their abil-
ity to function due to stoppages in electricity, water, gas, 
and communication lines. Kobe City General Hospi-
tal, the other municipal hospital, with 1,000 beds, had 
buildings tough enough to withstand the earthquake but 
damages to its utilities (water and gas) and the fragility 
of its equipment deprived the hospital of its proper func-
tions as the central hospital and emergency center in the 
disaster. The main causes of hospital dysfunction in this 
case were destruction of the water reservoir at the top of 
the building and the insufficient fixation of equipment.
 Information sharing between the hospitals was 
insufficient.2 It is reported that there were consider-
able differences among the hospitals in the number of 
patients that were given medical care on the day of the 
earthquake. For example, one local hospital received 
1,033 patients with only seven doctors present (Pts/MD 
= 147.6), while a university hospital located only a mile 
away from that hospital received 366 patients with 112 
doctors present (Pts/MD = 3.3). 
 In the stricken areas, physicians, nurses and phar-
macists were in short supply, but the medical response 
teams were so behind with arrivals that they were not 
able to offer lifesaving medical care to many patients. 
Helicopters were not used often enough at that time to 
transport patients with severe injuries to hospitals out-
side the affected area to receive necessary treatment. 
 Tanaka3 conducted a detailed survey about the mor-
bidity and mortality rates of hospitalized patients during 
the initial 15 days after the Hanshin-Awaji earthquake. 
The medical records of 6,107 patients who were admit-
ted to 95 hospitals (48 affected hospitals within the di-
saster area and 47 back-up hospitals in the surrounding 
area) were examined. Significant differences in the mor-
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tality rates of patients with crush syndrome were observed 
between those seen in the hospitals within the disaster area 
and those in the back-up hospitals outside the affected area 
(17.8% and 9.1%, respectively). Significant differences in 
the mortality rates for patients with other injuries were also 
observed between the two groups (6.8% and 2.3%, respec-
tively). In contrast, there were no significant differences 
found between patients admitted with illnesses. These 
data indicate that patients with crush syndrome and other 
disaster-related injuries should have been transported to 
and treated in hospitals outside the affected area (Table 1). 
JAPANESE NATIONAL DISASTER MEDICAL 
SYSTEM (NDMS)
After the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, the Ministry 
of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW) issued, on May 
10, 1996, a core plan entitled “Improvement of initial 
emergency care system reinforcement at disasters” (Table 
2).
Disaster base hospital
The disaster base hospital (DBH) is a hospital that 
plays an important role in preparing for and managing 
disasters. It is required to have a quake-resistant con-
struction, firm lifelines, and will become the center for 
the acceptance of patients or the dispatch of required 
personnel when a disaster occurs. In 1996, the MHLW 
issued requirement criteria for the DBH and ordered all 
prefectures to designate DBHs (Table 3). By April 2012, 
653 hospitals had been appointed as DBHs.4
Table 1. Mortality of hospitalized patients after the 1995 Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake3
Total No. of deaths/total No. of 
patients (%)
Affected hospitals, No. of 
deaths/total No. of patients (%)
Backup hospitals, No. of 
deaths/total No. of patients (%)
Crush syndrome  50/372  (13.4)  33 /185 (17.8)*  17 /187 (9.1)
Other injuries  128/2,346  (5.5)  112 /1,644 (6.8)*  16 /702 (2.3)
Illnesses  349/3,389 (10.3)  216 /1,988 (10.9)  133 /1,399 (9.5)
Total  527/6,107 (8.6)  392 /4,333 (9.0)  166 /2,290 (7.3)
*Significant difference versus in the backup hospitals.
Copyright 1998 by Elsevier Science Inc. All rights reserved. 
No., number.
Table 2. Improvement of initial emergency care system 
reinforcement at disaster
1. Promotion of the participation of medical personnel in local 
disaster prevention meetings
2. Arrangements of the mutual aid agreement at disaster
3. Maintenance of Emergency Medical Information System for a 
wide-area disaster
4. Maintenance of the disaster base hospitals
5. Reinforcement of the public health center function to affect 
disaster medical care
6. Spread awareness about the disaster medical care, the training, 
and enforcement of the drills
7. Practical use of hospital disaster prevention manual preparation 
guidelines
8. Cooperation with the firefighting organization at disaster
9. Maintenance of the postmortem examination system at disaster
Issued on May 10, 1996 by the Ministry of Health, Labour and 
Welfare Health Policy Bureau
Table 3. Disaster base hospital designation require-
ments
1. Accept all seriously injured or ill patients from the stricken area 
around the clock
2. Conduct the aeromedical shuttling by helicopter for patients 
and medical supplies between the disaster base hospital in the 
stricken area and disaster base hospital outside the stricken area
3. Hold disaster dispatch medical care team (DMAT)
4. Have surge capacity (two times for inpatients and five times for 
outpatients)
5. Earthquake-resistant structure
6. In-hospital generator, capable of operation 60% of the hospital’s 
electrical needs, and with fuel for three days
7. Tray water tank of appropriate capacity, possession of the well
8. Helicopter landing pad at the hospital site
9. Have the following practice equipment
•  Satellite phone
•  Satellite line Internet
•  Multiple means of communication
•  Emergency Medical Information System (EMIS)
•  Lifesaving medical care kits for the seriously ill emergency 
patients
•  Carrying-type lifesaving medical care equipment, medical 
supplies, tent, generator, drinking water, food, life supply, and 
triage tag
•  Emergency vehicle or ambulance
DMAT, disaster medical assistance team; EMIS, emergency 
medical information system.
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Emergency medical information system
An emergency medical information system (EMIS) is a 
medical information sharing system using the Internet. 
The purpose of an EMIS is to share information about 
hospitals, patients, disaster medical assistance teams, 
medical evacuation, medical supplies and medications, 
shelters, and so on with all personnel who are involved 
in disaster medical activities. An EMIS is able to inte-
grate this information in order to effectively deal with 
needs and demands, and adjust the distribution of pa-
tients, medical supplies, medications, DMATs and trans-
portation means.5
Disaster medical assistance team
A disaster medical assistance team (DMAT) is a medi-
cal team consisting of doctors, nurses and co-medical 
personnel dispatched to an affected area immediately 
after a disaster happens to provide acute care for vic-
tims.6 Although one DMAT consists of only four or five 
members in order to easily move to the designated area 
as quickly as possible, 30 to 50 DMATs are assembled 
to help at the DBH and aeromedical evacuation (AE) 
staging bases or airports in an affected area to stabilize 
and transport injured patients.7, 8 DMATs also play an 
important role in gathering medical information in a 
very acute phase and inputting it into the EMIS to map 
out a strategy for providing lifesaving interventions and 
coordinating their activities.
Aeromedical evacuation
A large number of people are wounded, often seriously 
wounded, at the time of a large-scale earthquake disaster 
in the stricken area. In addition to this, it is expected that 
sufficient medical services become impossible due to 
lost infrastructure from the damage to medical facilities 
and the lack of healthcare workers.9 A strategy to send 
the required personnel to a stricken area, and to stabilize 
and transport patients to receive treatment outside the 
stricken area, is necessary. Therefore, a DMAT should 
be dispatched from an outside area into the stricken area 
to stabilize patients and transport the seriously injured 
to DBHs outside of the stricken area, to offer definitive 
medical care, such as surgery, hemodialysis and inten-
sive care. Since continuous observation and seamless 
care by a DMAT is required, the series of activities to 
transport severely injured patients is called medical 
evacuation (Fig. 1), AE when aircraft are involved.
Fig. 1. Picture in a C-1 aircraft flying with the patients. During the 
flight, continuous observation and seamless care by a DMAT is 
required.




Fig. 2. Aircraft used for national aeromedical evacuation.









































 Medical evacuation is classified into three catego-
ries: i) long-distance evacuation by military aircraft (Figs. 
2A, B and C), which are mainly operated by the Cabinet 
Office headquarters (national AE); ii) moderate-distance 
evacuation to a neighboring prefecture by a helicopter 
(Fig. 2B), which is mainly operated by the prefectural 
headquarters (local type-1 AE); iii) short-distance evac-
uation inside the affected prefecture by ground or air 
transportation, which is mainly operated by the city gov-
ernment or fire department’s headquarters (local type-2 
medical evacuation).
    The national AE plans mainly consist of three parts: 
DMAT gathering and transport by military aircraft (Fig. 
3A), AE staging activities (Fig. 3B), and patient transfer 
by military aircraft (Fig. 3C).
EXPERIENCES OF THE GREAT EAST JAPAN 
EARTHQUAKE 
On March 11, 2011, a huge, magnitude 9.0 earthquake 
and subsequent powerful tsunami hit the Tohoku area 
of Japan, leaving 15,891 people dead, 6,152 injured, 
C
A B
Fig. 3. Outline of national aeromedical evacuation.
A: DMAT gathering and transport by military aircraft.
B: Setting of staging care unit at the AE staging base and 
patient’s transfer to the staging care unit.
C: Patient’s transfer by military aircraft 
Blue arrows indicate the movement of DMATs and red ar-
rows indicate the movement of patients.
AE, Aeromedical Evacuation; DBH, disaster base hospital; 
DMAT, disaster medical assistance team.
and 2,579 missing. Immediately after the disaster, 383 
DMATs, comprising 1,852 members from all over Japan, 
were involved in acute phase activities in the affected 
area for 12 days, such as headquarters administration, 
hospital support, AE staging activities, and patient trans-
port by land and air. In this paper, I describe the details 
of the AEs performed by DMATs.
Decision on national AE enforcement
In general, it is extremely difficult to accurately grasp 
the severity of damage immediately after the occurrence 
of a large-scale earthquake. A Disaster Information 
System (DIS), which the Cabinet Office has developed, 
can be used to estimate the gross damage situation us-
ing a geographical information system, which integrates 
information, such as topography, the ground situation, 
population, buildings, disaster prevention facilities, into 
a digital map on the computer. Based on results from the 
DIS and the damage reports provided by each ministry 
and government office, it was estimated that the number 
of casualties would be greater than 10,000 just after the 
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earthquake and tsunami took place.
    The national AE adjustment group (C5 Group) from 
the Extreme Disaster Management Headquarters at the 
Prime Minister's Office, the Anti-Disaster Measures 
Room at the MHLW, and the DMAT Secretariat at the 
National Disaster Medical Center decided to give the 
go-ahead for national AE by 2:00 on March 12, which 
was approximately 12 hours after the occurrence of the 
earthquake. According to the pre-existing national AE 
plan, a DMAT gathering order to the designated bases 
was made for DMAT members all over Japan, and AE 
staging bases inside and outside the stricken area were 
designated (Table 4).
Table 4. DMAT assembly point, AE staging base inside and outside the stricken area
AE staging base
DMAT assembly point Inside the stricken area Outside the stricken area
JASDF Chitose Airbase Iwate Hanamaki Airport JASDF Chitose Airbase
Osaka International Airport (Itami Airport) Fukushima Airport Tokyo International Airport (Haneda Airport)
JASDF Kasuga Airbase Camp Kasuminome Akita Airport
AE, aeromedical evacuation; DMAT, disaster medical assistance team; JASDF, Japan Air Self Defense Force.
Wide area emergency transportation of DMAT 
members 
Since Chitose Air Base of the Japan Air Self-Defense 
Force (JASDF), Kasuga Air Base of the JASDF, and 
Osaka International Airport (Itami Airport) had been 
appointed as the DMAT gathering airports and bases, 
approximately 393 DMAT members, divided into 78 
teams, were gathered and transported by JASDF aircraft 
to two AE staging bases (Table 5). Other DMAT teams 
made their way to the AE staging bases by ground trans-
portation.
Table 5. Transport of DMAT by the Self-Defense Forces Aircraft




































15:34 → C-130 → Iwate Hanamaki 
Airport
17:30 11 55




→ CH47 → Camp Kasuminome 9:53 8 38




→ CH47 → Camp Kasuminome 10:50 7 38




→ CH47 → Camp Kasuminome 24:20 9 42
All 78 393
DMAT, disaster medical assistance team; JASDF, Japan Air Self Defense Force. 
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Setting of staging care unit at the AE staging base
From the early morning of March 12, a Staging Care 
Unit (SCU), which is a medical facility at the AE 
staging base, was installed at Hanamaki Airport,
Fukushima Airport, and at the Japan Ground Self De-
fense Force (JGSDF) Camp Kasuminome, where 69, 
14 and 24 DMAT teams were placed, respectively. At 
Hanamaki and Fukushima Airports, where runways 
were long enough for JASDF fixed-wing aircraft to 
take off and land, a national AE with such aircraft was 
planned. On the other hand, both Sendai Airport and 
JASDF Matsushima Air Base in Miyagi Prefecture 
were buried under water and unusable for the tak-
ing off and landing of these aircraft; therefore, Camp
Kasuminome, which did not have a runway, was ap-
pointed as a substitute AE staging base. In addition, a 
helicopter emergency medical service (HEMS) gather-
ing base and a HEMS adjustment headquarters were 
set up at Hanamaki and Fukushima Airports, but not 
at Camp Kasuminome.10 Summaries of the activities of 
each SCU are shown in Tables 6 and 7.
Table 6. The number of DMATs involved and the number of transports in each SCU
Iwate Hanamaki Airport SCU Fukushima Airport SCU Camp Kasuminome SCU All
Opened 12-Mar 12-Mar 12-Mar
Closed 16-Mar 14-Mar 16-Mar
Number of DMATs involved 69 teams 14 teams 24 teams 107 teams
National AE 16 3 0 19
Local Type 1* 0 0 8 8
Type 2† 120 0 190 310
All 136 3 198 337
*Type 1: Transportation to neighboring prefecture. †Type 2: Transportation inside the stricken prefecture.
AE, aeromedical evacuation; DMAT, disaster medical assistance team; SCU, staging care unit.
 
Table 7. Activities of each SCU
Iwate Hanamaki airport SCU Camp Kasuminome SCU Fukushima Airport SCU
All
Local type 1* Local type 2† National Local type 1* Local type 2† National Local type 1* Local type 2† National
12-Mar 0 66 4 3 6 0 0 0 3 82
13-Mar 0 33 6 5 16 0 0 0 0 60
14-Mar 0 17 3 0 150 0 0 0 0 170
15-Mar 0 4 3 0 18 0 0 0 0 25
16-Mar 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
All 0 120 16 8 190 0 0 0 3 337
*Type 1: Transportation to neighboring prefecture. †Type 2: Transportation inside the stricken prefecture.
SCU, staging care unit.
Summary of the national AE (Table 8, Table 9)
In total, 19 patients were transported by JASDF fixed-
wing aircraft as part of the national AE. Four pa-
tients were transported by a JASDF C-1 carrier from 
Hanamaki Airport to the JASDF Chitose Base on 
March 12 and arrived at hospitals in Sapporo and nearby 
soon thereafter. Three patients were transported from 
Fukushima Airport to Haneda Airport, and then trans-
ported to hospitals in Tokyo. Six patients were trans-
ported from Hanamaki Airport to Haneda Airport by a 
JASDF C-1 carrier on March 13, and then transported 
to hospitals in Tokyo. Three patients were transported 
from Hanamaki Airport to Akita Airport by a JASDF 
C-1 carrier on March 14 and 15, and then transported to 
medical institutions in Akita City. Because there were 
many patients with hypothermia and pneumonia (tsunami 
lungs) as a result of the tsunami, as well as inpatients of 
the hospitals in coastal areas that had lost functional-
ity, some patients with malignant tumors and those in 
a postoperative state were included in addition to those 
injured by the earthquake and tsunami.
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Table 8. Summary of National AE 
Flight Date Departure AP Departure time Carriers Arrival AP Arrival time Number of patients
#1 12-Mar Iwate Hanamaki AP 19:55 C-1 JASDF Chitose AB 20:40 4
#2 12-Mar Fukushima AP 21:48 C-1 Tokyo International AP (Haneda AP) 22:15 3
#3 13-Mar Iwate Hanamaki AP 21:25 C-1 Tokyo International AP (Haneda AP) 22:25 6
#4 14-Mar Iwate Hanamaki AP 19:50 C-1 Akita AP 20:20 3
#5 15-Mar Iwate Hanamaki AP 14:55 C-1 Akita AP 15:41 3
AB, Airbase; AE, aeromedical evacuation; AP, Airport.
Table 9. Patient list of national AE
No. Age (years old) Sex Duration* Distance (km)† Diagnosis
1 66 F 1:38 756 ARDS, pneumonia, left upper arm degloving injury
2 34 M 1:40 722 Right hip dislocation fracture
3 45 M 1:48 814 Bilateral hemothorax, pulmonary contusion, multiple rib fractures 
4 99 F 1:35 730 Humerus fracture
5 64 M 1:26 677 Crush syndrome
6 61 F 1:32 682 Right leg amputation
7 40 M 1:37 672 Crush syndrome
8 89 F 2:17 698 Cholelithiasis, cholangitis, cholecystitis
9 58 M 2:15 696 Colorectal cancer, ileus
10 72 M 2:45 704 Small intestine malignant lymphoma
11 Unknown M 1:57 690 Seizure, epilepsy
12 77 F 1:50 689 Postoperative ileus
13 70 M 2:08 701 Ileus
14 82 F 1:18 261 Pneumonia
15 86 F 1:10 235 Diabetes, hypertension
16 78 F 1:05 235 Multiple rib fracture, left fibula fracture, lumbar fracture
17 86 F 1:39 268 Brain contusion
18 83 M 1:35 275 Bilateral pneumonia
19 71 F 1:35 280 Left hemothorax, atelectasis, right subdural hematoma
*The duration between departure from SCU in the affected area and arrival at destination hospital.
†The distance between hospital in the affected area and arrival at destination hospital.
AE, aeromedical evacuation; F, female; M, male; SCU, staging care unit.
Summary of local government AE operated by 
Miyagi Prefecture Headquarters (Table 10)
In Miyagi, transport by helicopters from a hospital in 
Sendai City to Yamagata, in the neighboring prefecture 
(local type-1), was carried out via Camp Kasuminome 
on March 13. This was performed under the supervision 
of the Miyagi Prefectural Disaster Management Head-
quarters.
DISCUSSION AND PERSPECTIVE
The Japanese NDMS, consisting mainly of four parts, 
namely, DBHs, an EMIS, DMATs and AE, has been de-
veloped over the past 16 years since the Hanshin-Awaji 
Earthquake and was tested for the first time in a real di-
saster situation as a result of the Great East Japan Earth-
quake. The following issues became evident through 
experiences with the latter earthquake.11, 12
DMATs worked well according to the preexist-
ing plan and exercises but had some problems in 
terms of logistics and accommodations
The Japanese DMAT, which is composed of only a few 
people and, therefore, dispatches quickly, is gathered 
in the affected area, works systematically on activities 
such as establishing headquarters, treatment and evacu-
ation activities at hospitals and AE staging bases, and 
monitoring and caring for patients in helicopters and 
fixed-wing aircraft according to the preexisting plan and 
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1 12-Mar 28 M NHO Sendai Medical Center
Okitama General 
HP Helicopter 105 Crush syndrome, thoracic injury
2 12-Mar 68 M NHO Sendai Medical Center
Nihonkai General 
HP Helicopter 177 Hypothermia, right leg buttocks ache
3 12-Mar 56 M NHO Sendai Medical Center
Yamagata Prefec-
tural Central HP Helicopter 73 Subarachnoid hemorrhage




sity HP Helicopter 67 Splenic injury, right pneumothorax
5 13-Mar 72 M Tohoku University HP
Yamagata City HP 
Saiseikan Helicopter 64 Brain contusion, cerebral hemorrhage
6 13-Mar 27 F NHO Sendai Medical Center Shonai HP Helicopter 161
Spinal cord injury, pelvic fracture 
(post-TAE)
7 13-Mar 49 M NHO Sendai Medical Center
Yamagata Prefec-
tural Central HP Helicopter 73 Multiple fractures, Schizophrenia
8 13-Mar 37 F NHO Sendai Medical Center
Yamagata City HP 
Saiseikan Helicopter 75 Pelvic fracture
*The distance between hospital in the affected area and arrival at destination hospital.
F, female; HP, Hospital; M, male; NHO, National Hospital Organization; TAE, transcatheter arterial embolization.
is believed to be a big factor.10 
    At the Hanamaki SCU, DMAT dispatch to the coastal 
region and patient tranport from the coastal region were 
carried out by HEMS. At the Camp Kasuminome SCU, 
the peak of the transport was late, on March 14, the third 
day after the disaster occurrence, due to a lack of early 
mobile DMAT transportation and patient transport, be-
cause a HEMS base was not located at the Kasuminome 
SCU. 
    In addition, at the Fukushima Airport SCU, a huge 
area above Fukushima Prefecture was appointed as a 
no-fly zone because of the accident at the Fukushima 
Nuclear Power Plant, and it is believed that patient res-
cue and transport using HEMS was difficult.13
Need for national AE was low, although the need 
for local AE and ground transport was high
A wide area AE plan had been developed based on an 
assumption of damage caused by the collapse of build-
ings, as was the case in the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earth-
quake and the Tokai Earthquakes before it. Therefore, 
the victims expected for the wide area AE were con-
sidered to be those with severe injuries and burns, and 
crush syndrome. However, in the case of the Great East 
Japan Earthquake, there were many patients with pre-
dominantly internal injuries caused by the tsunami, such 
as hypothermia, pneumonia and dermatitis.12 Above 
all, there were many inpatients such as those in a post-
operative state, as well as cancer patients or elderly cere-
bral, cardiovascular, pneumonic and mental patients in 
those hospitals that lost functionality due to the damage 
caused by the earthquake and tsunami.
exercises. For many of the members, the food support, 
transportation, and accommodations were not sufficient.
AE plans should be continued in all metropolises 
and districts
The carrying out of such a wide area AE for the first 
time in the aftermath of the Great East Japan Earthquake 
deserves significant praise. On the other hand, it took 29 
hours for the first flight to take off after the occurrence of 
the disaster. The reasons for the delay included that there 
was no national AE plan for an earthquake in the Miyagi 
area due to low prior damage expectations. Before the 
Great East Japan Earthquake happened, the Japanese 
government had been focused on the Tokai, Tonankai, 
and Nankai regions, or a Tokyo Inland Earthquake, and 
developed the national AE plan only for those areas. 
Given our experiences after the Great East Japan Earth-
quake, all metropolises and districts in Japan should have 
an AE plan and should choose an AE staging base or 
airport where all required equipment will be prepared, 
stored, and training exercises with them will be held.
SCU with cooperation of HEMS effective for mo-
bile patient transport in early period of disaster
At the Hanamaki Airport SCU, 109 patients were at-
tended to for two days in the immediate aftermath of 
the disaster, and national AE and local type-2 medical 
evacuation were carried out. On the other hand, the 
number of accepted patients at the SCU was confined 
to 30 at the Camp Kasuminome SCU in the initial two 
days. Various factors may have contributed to this differ-
ence, but the positioning of a HEMS base at each SCU 
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CONCLUSION
The Japanese NDMS, consisting mainly of four parts, 
namely, DBHs, an EMIS, DMATs and AE, has been de-
veloped over the past 16 years since the Hanshin-Awaji 
Earthquake and was tested for the first time in a real di-
saster situation as a result of the Great East Japan Earth-
quake. It became clear that the Japanese NDMS played 
an important role in the Great East Japan Earthquake.
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